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Abstract
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents
trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive …nancial contracts, un-
der conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and
the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive
equilibria in this framework are identi…ed, and shown to be essentially the
same under di¤erent forms of asymmetric information. We then show that
a ’minimal’ form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread, requiring only
the possibility to separate buyers and sellers), and the condition that the
aggregate return on the individual positions in each contract can be per-
fectly hedged in the existing markets, ensure the existence of competitive
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1. Introduction
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economic environments characterized
by the presence of asymmetric information; both situations of moral hazard and
adverse selection are allowed for.
Agents are assumed to trade in spot markets and markets for …nancial con-
tracts. These contracts are (i) standardized and (ii) non-exclusive, in the sense
that the terms of each contract (its price and its payo¤) are, respectively, common
across many relationships involving di¤erent agents, and independent of the level
of transactions made by an agent in other markets. Under these conditions the
partners of a contractual relationship have a very limited power over the terms of
the contract. Also, at an equilibrium each agent will typically trade in di¤erent
markets, and enter di¤erent contracts at the same time. We argue that in such
a situation a general equilibrium approach is useful to analyze the interaction
among trades in di¤erent markets; also that we may analyze contracts, as well as
commodities, as traded in competitive markets. Our analysis builds on the earlier
work by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1995), who explicitly addressed this
issue in a model where asymmetric information is generated by the possibility of
default.
Hence we depart from the analysis of exclusive contractual relationships, where
an agent can only choose one out of a menu of contracts, or equivalently the terms
of a contract depend on the position of the agent in all markets. The implementa-
tion of these contracts imposes a very strong informational requirement as all the
transactions of an agent need to be observed. The non-exclusivity of contracts
matches then the observation that, for instance, agents often hold various insur-
ance policies, and get loans both from banks and from credit card companies1.
Also, the terms of contracts very rarely depend on the agents’ transactions in
other markets2. Moreover, well-de…ned markets operate where standardized con-
1Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide some evidence on the composition of credit sources for
small businesses in the U.S.
2See Smith and Warner (1979) for an analysis of the terms of debt contracts in the U.S..
2tracts are traded: markets for credit and insurance contracts, or mortgages, are
important examples, as well as markets for any …nancial security which allows for
a default clause. The recent di¤usion of the securitization of payo¤s of contracts
has also enhanced the use of standardized contracts (see Kendall and Fishman
(1996)).
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the conditions for the ’viability’
of competitive markets for contracts in the presence of asymmetric information.
In this context, the payo¤ of a contract typically depends on the characteristics of
the agent trading the contract (as, for instance, in insurance contracts against an
individual source of risk). Hence when the same (type of, standardized) contract is
entered by di¤erent agents, this is e¤ectively a di¤erent contract. However, when
the agents’ characteristics are only privately observed these di¤erent contracts
cannot be separated and are traded together in a single market. As a consequence
a problem may arise in ensuring feasibility in such markets since there may not
be ’enough prices’ to clear these markets.
If the quantities traded by an agent in all existing markets are a fully revealing
signal of the agent’s type, of his private characteristics, exclusive contracts, where
the terms of a contract depend on the trades of the agent in the various markets,
allow to solve this problem - by separating agents of di¤erent types - and to
clear markets. This was shown by Prescott and Townsend (1984a) to be possible,
under general conditions, when asymmetric information is of the moral hazard
type, though not in the case of adverse selection. In adverse selection economies
in fact the quantities traded may not fully reveal the private characteristics of
the agents trading the contract, i.e. agents cannot be separated, so that what
are e¤ectively di¤erent contracts have to be traded in a single market at the
same price. Furthermore, as we already argued, the possibility of implementing
exclusive contracts is a very demanding requirement. When exclusive contracts
are not available, the feasibility problem we identi…ed above arises also for moral
hazard economies.
In this paper we show that two prices (a bid and an ask price) for each contract
are enough to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium in economies
where trade takes place under asymmetric information. The result requires the
additional condition that the aggregate return on the individual positions in a
given contract can be perfectly hedged on the existing markets (asset markets
are ’su¢ciently’ complete), or is also marketed as a distinct claim (i.e. all indi-
vidual positions in the contract are pooled together and securitized in a ’pool’
security, whose payo¤ is the average total net amount due to agents who traded
3the contract3). The importance of the role of ’pool’ securities for economies with
asymmetric information was …rst stressed by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik
(1995).
When ’pool’ securities are either directly or indirectly traded, the simple abil-
ity to di¤erentiate prices for buying and selling positions is su¢cient for the exis-
tence of competitive equilibria. We are able to show in particular that non-trivial
equilibria always exist, and to derive some properties of the equilibrium prices
of contracts. We should stress that our results hold both under moral hazard
and adverse selection, and no matter what is the ’dimension’ of the sources of
asymmetric information in the economy (i.e. of the cardinality of the set of un-
observable possible types or actions of the agents trading the contract).4
This form of non-linearity of prices (i.e. of dependence of the unit price of a
contract on the quantity traded of that contract) is ‘minimal’ in the sense that it
only arises at one point and, more importantly, can be implemented by observing
only the level (in fact the sign) of trades in each particular transaction, without
even knowing the other transactions of the agent in the same contract. But it
is also ’minimal’ in the sense that we will show that without it, i.e. if prices
of contracts are linear over the whole domain, competitive equilibria may fail to
exist in economies with asymmetric information: a robust example of an economy
with adverse selection is presented where at all prices the total net payo¤ to
agents trading individual contracts is positive. Evidently, our results also imply
the existence of competitive equilibria for the case in which stronger forms of non-
linearity of prices can be implemented (i.e. when all trades in the same market, or
even possibly in other markets, can be monitored), as long as the price is allowed
to be non-linear at the level of zero trades.
The identi…cation of the ’problems’ for the existence of competitive equilibria
with linear prices in economies with asymmetric information is one of the main
contributionsof thispaper. Not only these problemsare shown tobe common both
to moral hazard and adverse selection economies, but in our framework adverse
selection can be seen, at an abstract level, as a reduced form of moral hazard.
As a consequence of such problems, while in the case of symmetric information
competitive equilibria always exist under standard assumptions, when there is
3See also the …nal section for further discussions on this.
4The only restriction we (in fact have to) impose on the speci…cation of contracts’ payo¤s
is that, even in the presence of asymmetric information, there are no unbounded arbitrage
opportunities, for at least some prices. Alternatively, a bound on the set of admissible trades in
contracts can be imposed, without the need in such case of any restriction on the speci…cation
of the contracts’ payo¤.
4asymmetric information some restriction on trades is needed. The main purpose
of such restrictions is to provide a mechanism according to which gains and losses
agents make on the basis of their private information are redistributed in the
economy.
The analysis is developed in the framework of a two-period, pure exchange
economy. A large economy is considered, with in…nitely many agents, of …nitely
many types. There is both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. Aggregate
shocks are commonly observed. On the other hand agents may have private
information over the realization of their idiosyncratic shocks. Agents can trade
contracts whose payo¤ depends on the realization of the aggregate as well as
the idiosyncratic shocks a¤ecting them. These are standardized contracts, in the
sense that their speci…cation (their payo¤ structure) is common across agents: all
contracts of the same type are ex ante identical and sell at the same price, though
the payo¤ of a unit of them depends on the realization of a speci…c idiosyncratic
shock.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the class of
economies we consider and the case of symmetric information is examined in Sec-
tion 3. Asymmetric information is introduced then in Section 4 and the problems
for the existence of competitive equilibria are identi…ed. Section 5 provides a
robust example of non-existence of competitive equilibrium for a simple adverse
selection economy. In Section 6 the existence of competitive equilibria is estab-
lished. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature. Our analysis was signi…cantly inspired by the work of
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1995) (also Geanakoplos, Zame and Dubey
(1996)). These authors study the competitive equilibria of economies where stan-
dardized securities are traded and agents have the choice to default on their con-
tractual obligations; thus a situation of asymmetric information originates and is
captured by the possibility of default. The fact that both in their and our set-up
agents have some control over the payo¤ of the securities they trade generates
important similarities in the analysis. Moreover, we also use Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik (1995)’s construction of ’pool’ securities to aggregate the payo¤ of se-
curities traded by agents under asymmetric information.5 In the model considered
by Dubey et al. the possibility of default is the only source of an agent’s ability
to a¤ect the payo¤ of the contracts he trades; since agents may only default on
5This construction is also used by Minelli and Polemarchakis (1996) in an analysis of Akerlof’s
model of the used car market.
5their short positions, a one-side constraint naturally originates in such framework.
Consistently with our existence result then, no feasibility problem arises in this
model and existence can be proved under standard conditions.
Extending this work, Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis
(1998) show that competitive equilibria for several types of asymmetric informa-
tion economies (including for instance insurance economies with adverse selection
and/or moral hazard, Akerlof’s ’lemons’ economies, economies with default, mon-
itoring, tournaments, and others) share a common structure and can be analyzed
within the set-up of a common abstract model.
The pioneering work of Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) constitutes an im-
portant reference for any analysis of economies with asymmetric information in
the framework of general equilibrium, competitive models. These authors con-
sider an economy where competitive markets for all state-contingent commodities
are open at the beginning of time and agents’ consumption plans are subject to
the additional restriction that they have to be incentive compatible. Prescott and
Townsend show that, for economies with moral hazard, competitive equilibria al-
ways exist, and are constrained e¢cient, while the extension of their approach
to economies with adverse selection is problematic.6 It is easy to see that the
contractual relationships which generate the equilibria considered in their analy-
sis satisfy a very strong exclusivity condition (indirectly induced by the fact that
contingent consumption plans are restricted by an overall incentive compatibility
constraint).7
Helpman and La¤ont (1975) (see also(La¤ont (1976)) present an example of an
economy with moral hazard where, with linear prices, no competitive equilibrium
exists. As we argue more in detail in another paper (Bisin and Gottardi (1997)),
the lack of existence in that example can be imputed to the same kinds of problems
as the ones discussed here.
Competitive equilibria for adverse selection economies in a general equilib-
rium framework are also studied by Gale (1992), (1996). Though the structure
of markets, and in particular the role of prices and the speci…cation of the mar-
ket clearing conditions are rather di¤erent from the ones considered here, it is
important to notice that Gale looks at economies where agents can be ex-ante
partitioned into buyers and sellers (which again introduces what is e¤ectively a
6See however, Hammond (1989), Bennardo and Chiappori (1998).
7See Lisboa (1996), Bennardo (1997), Citanna and Villanacci (1997) for existence results
under an explicit exclusivity condition when, in addition, re-trading in future spot markets is
allowed.
6form of one-side constraint).
The importance and the consequences of asymmetric information in large
economies are examined by Gul and Postlewaite (1992), Postlewaite and McLean
(1996). They study a class of economies with adverse selection for which they
show that, as the economy becomes large, the consequences of the presence of
asymmetric information tend to disappear (the set of constrained e¢cient alloca-
tions tends to coincide with the set of fully Pareto e¢cient allocations). This is
not the case in our set-up: even though the economy is large, agents still retain
some private information over the payo¤ of the securities they trade.
The e¢ciency of competitive equilibria for economies with moral hazard and
exclusive contracts, after the decentralization result obtained by Prescott and
Townsend, has been recently examined by Lisboa (1996), Bennardo (1997), Ci-
tanna and Villanacci (1997), Magill and Quinzii (1997). On the other hand, the
consequences for e¢ciency of abandoning exclusivity have been discussed (again
only for the moral hazard case, and for simple economies with a single market
and ex-ante identical agents) by Hellwig (1983), Arnott and Stiglitz (1993), Bisin
and Guaitoli (1996), Kahn and Mookerjee (1997). The e¢ciency properties of
competitive equilibria in our framework will be analyzed in another paper.
Finally the literature on General Equilibrium models with Incomplete Markets
should also be mentioned.8 This has developed a general framework which extends
the methodology of the Arrow-Debreu model to the analysis of competitive equi-
libria under uncertainty (with symmetric information), when agents are not able
to fully insure against all sources of risk. In such framework the set of markets in
which agents are allowed to trade (in particular of contingent markets) is taken
as exogenously given. We show in this paper that the presence of asymmetric
information generates some restrictions on the set of the agents’ insurance oppor-
tunities arising endogenously from the agents’ incentive compatibility constraints
and the conditions for the viability of markets.9
2. The Structure of the Economy
We consider a two-period pure exchange economy. There are L commodities,
labelled by l 2 L = f1;:::;Lg; available for consumption both at date 0 and at
date 1; commodity 1 is the designated numeraire in every spot. The agents in the
8See Geanakoplos (1990), and Magill and Shafer (1991) for surveys of this literature.
9See Du¢e and Rahi (1995) for a survey of other approaches to endogenizing market
incompleteness.
7economy are of …nitely many types, indexed by h 2 H = f1;:::;Hg; and there are
countably many agents of each type. An agent is then identi…ed by a pair (h;n);
where n 2 N (N is the set of natural numbers); ¸
h denotes the fraction of the
total population made of agents of type h:
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is described by the collection of random variables
~ ¾; (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N; with support, respectively § and (Sh)h2H (the same for all n).
Both § and Sh are assumed to be …nite sets, § = f1;:::;§g and Sh = f1;:::;Shg;
with generic element ¾ and sh:
The random variable ~ ¾ describes the economy’s aggregate uncertainty, which
a¤ects all agents in the economy, while ~ sn ´ (~ sh;n)h2H is an idiosyncratic shock,
which only a¤ectsthe (H) agents of index n. We assume that the variables (~ sn)n2N
are, conditionally on ¾, identically and independently distributed across n: Let ¼
denote the common probability distribution of (~ ¾; ~ sh;n); and ¼(s=¾) ´ ¼((~ s1;n =
s1;::; ~ sH;n = sH)=¾). We have so:
Assumption 1
² ¼(~ sh;n = sh) = ¼(~ sh;n0 = sh) 8n;n0 2 N;sh 2 Sh:
² ¼(~ sh;n = sh;~ sh0;n0 = sh0 j ¾) = ¼(~ sh;n = sh j ¾)¼(~ sh0;n0 = sh0 j ¾) 8n 6= n0 2
N;h;h0 2 H;sh;sh0 2 Sh:
On the other hand we allow ~ sh;n to be correlated, conditionally on ¾; with
~ sh0;n, for h0 6= h: We also allow for the possible correlation of ~ sn with ~ ¾.10
A metaphor may be useful to clarify the structure of the uncertainty: we may
think of n as indexing di¤erent ’villages’ (there are then in…nitely many, ex-ante
identical villages), while h indexes di¤erent professional types inside each village.
The idiosyncratic shocks a¤ecting the H di¤erent professional types in each village
may be correlated among them, but are independent across villages, conditionally
on the aggregate shock.
Remark 1. Both the correlation properties of the various sources of risk and the
general structure of the uncertainty will play an important role when asymmet-
ric information is introduced as they allow us to have competitive markets with
10In the following analysis the decomposition of the idiosyncratic shock ~ sn into the variables
~ sh;n;h 2 H; will be used to describe in turn the components of the idiosyncratic shock which is
only a¤ecting agent (h;n); or a signal such agent receives over the realization of his idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
8various types of informational asymmetries simply in correspondence of di¤erent
kinds of private information over the agents’ idiosyncratic shocks.
The possible correlation among the idiosyncratic shocks a¤ecting the agents in the
same village and their correlation with the aggregate shocks ensure that a non-
trivial speci…cation of the contracts is possible for all the types of asymmetric
information considered. In particular, it will allow us to have contracts exploiting
such correlations to extract some of the agents’ private information as for instance
in situations with relative performance evaluation11. Moreover, the presence of
aggregate uncertainty, besides allowing for greater generality, also implies that the
return on the aggregate of individual positions in a given contract is a complex
bundle of commodities, contingent on the realization of the aggregate uncertainty,
so that the possibility of hedging, directly or indirectly, this ’pool’ is a non-trivial
issue and requires the availability of appropriate securities.
On the other hand, the consideration of a large economy, with idiosyncratic risk,
implies that with private information over this risk agents will be ’small’ as far
as the level of their trades is concerned (so that their price-taking behavior is
justi…ed), but retain some monopolistic power with regard to their information,
i.e. some speci…c and exclusive information. Thus agents are not ’informationally
small’, even though the economy is large (unlike in the models considered by Gul
and Postlewaite (1990), McLean and Postlewaite (1996)).
Endowments. We will consider, with no loss of generality, the case in which
uncertainty enters the economy via the level of the agents’ date 1 endowment.
Each agent (h;n) 2 H £ N has an endowment wh
0 at date 0, and his date 1 en-
dowment, wh
1(~ ¾; ~ sn); depends upon the realization of ~ ¾ and ~ sn. Let S ´ ¦h2HSh






1(¾;s);¾ 2 §;s 2 S) 2 <
L(§S)
++ .
Preferences. A consumption plan for an arbitrary agent (h;n) speci…es the
level of consumption of the L commodities at date 0 and 1 in every state. The
consumption set is the non-negative orthant of the Euclidean space. Agents are
assumed tohave Von Neumann - Morgenstern preferences over consumption plans.
The utility index of agent (h;n) is given by a function uh : <2L
+ ! R satisfying:
11See Remark ?? for a more extended discussion on this.
9Assumption 3
uh is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Information Structure. The structure and distribution of the uncertainty is
known by all agents at the initial date 0: Throughout the analysis we will also
maintain the assumption that the aggregate shock ~ ¾ is realized at date 1; and
its realization is commonly observed by all agents. On the other hand, di¤erent
cases will be considered with respect to the information agents have over their
idiosyncratic shocks.
In our framework asymmetric information economies are characterized by the
fact that either the realization of the idiosyncratic shock component ~ sh;n or its
distribution are private information of agent (h;n): In particular, we will examine
the case of adverse selection economies, where the agents have private information
at the beginning of date 0, before markets open, over the realization of their idio-
syncratic shock, and of hidden information economies, where it is the realization
of the shock at date 1 to be private information. We intend to argue that the
latter have essentially the same properties as economies with the more standard
form of moral hazard, hidden action.12 Moreover, having reduced the various
types of informational asymmetries to various types of information over realiza-
tions of the uncertainty provides a clear benchmark of what the consequences of
private information are in terms of the extent to which insurance markets are
missing. The results we present here however do not depend on this particular
speci…cation and extend to other set-ups (see also Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi,
Minelli, Polemarchakis (1998) for a more explicit discussion on this).
3. Symmetric Information Economy
We will consider …rst the case of symmetric information. This provides a natural
and useful benchmark for the rest of the analysis. In presenting this case we
will introduce the structure of markets and the nature of the market clearing
conditions in our framework, which we will maintain throughout the analysis.
In this section we suppose that
12The main distinguishing feature both of economies with hidden information and moral
hazard, as we will see in the next sections (also Bisin and Gottardi (1997)), is that agents
are symmetrically informed at the time markets open, but have the possibility to a¤ect (the
distribution of) the payo¤ of the contracts they enter.
10² all idiosyncratic shocks (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N are realized at date 1 and are com-
monly observed.
The same is always true, as we said, for the aggregate shocks ~ ¾. Agents’
information is then perfectly symmetric.
Market Structure. Spot markets for the L commodities open both at date 0
and in every possible state at date 1:
At date 0 a set of markets for contingent contracts (or securities)13 also open.
More precisely, for every pair (~ sn; ~ ¾) there are J securities: each security j 2 J
pays rj(s;¾) units of numeraire if and only if the realization of (~ sn; ~ ¾) equals
(s;¾); and there is one of these securities for every n. These are standardized
securities in the sense that ex-ante all securities of a given type j are identical,
i.e. their payo¤ has the same distribution for all n; ex-post however, their payo¤
will be di¤erent, as it will vary with the speci…c realization of (~ sn)n2N across n.
This is natural in insurance markets, where insurance policies are standardized,
but payments depend on individual realization of shocks; similar considerations
hold for standard credit contracts, mortgages,...
Altogether there are then countably many of these securities in the economy,
but we will consider the case in which each agent (h;n) can only trade the J
securities with payo¤ contingent on the idiosyncratic shock ~ sn a¤ecting him (or
his ’village’), and on ~ ¾: We will show that in the present framework this is not
restrictive provided all agents can also trade J ‘pool’ securities: these securities
summarize in fact all agents could do by trading in the existing securities of index
n di¤erent from their own.
The payo¤ of ‘pool’ security j is de…ned so as to equal the opposite of the
average net amount (of the numeraire commodity) due to - or owed by - all
agents who traded securities of type j. Hence each ‘pool’ security can be viewed
as a claim against the (net) position of all agents in ‘individual’ securities of a
given type. By the Law of Large Numbers the payo¤ of ‘pool’ security j will only
depend on ¾ and be given by:
r
p











; ¾ 2 §
where µ
h
j denotes the amount of security j held by agents of type h (independent of
n aswe will show). Thisexpression clearly simpli…estor
p
j (¾) = ¡
P
s¼(s=¾)rj (s;¾)
13In what follows we will use interchangeably the terms contract and security.








All this has a very natural interpretation: the payo¤ of each ‘pool’ security is ob-
tained from the payo¤ of the underlying security simply by averaging out the
idiosyncratic component of its return (this is in fact diversi…ed away when we
consider the total - average - return on positions in in…nitely many ex-ante iden-
tical securities).
Pricing Structure. Markets are perfectly competitive, i.e. agents act as price-
takers in all markets. Moreover, all securities that are ex-ante identical (which
only di¤er in the index n) sell at the same price. Securities o¤ering the same
type of insurance against the idiosyncratic shocks in di¤erent ’villages’ are in fact
equivalent to the eyes of the outside investors, and hence, we argue, should sell
at the same price. On this basis we can claim that there is a uni…ed, large, com-
petitive market where all the (standardized) securities of a given type are traded
together. The level of trade of each agents will then be negligible with respect
to the aggregate level of trade in the market, thus justifying the assumption of
price-taking behavior on these markets too.14
We also consider the case where prices in both …nancial and spot markets are
a linear function of the level of their trades, and are also independent from agents’
observable characteristics (e.g. of their type h). The unit price of security j is
then denoted by qj (by the above perfect competition assumption, independent
of n); q ´ (qj)j2J: The (normalized) vector of spot prices of the L commodities
at date 0 and at date 1 when the aggregate shock is ¾, are denoted respectively
by p0 and p1(¾).
With regard to ’pool’ securities, we impose the condition that each ’pool’
security j sells at the opposite price of the underlying ‘individual’ security; ¡qj is
then the price of ’pool’ security j. This can be viewed as a no arbitrage condition
whenever agents are free to trade on securities with payo¤ contingent on other
agents’ (other ’villages’) idiosyncratic shocks or, as we will argue later, as a zero
pro…t condition if intermediaries are explicitly modelled.
In the present framework all agents of a given type h face the same choice prob-
lem, and this problem is convex. All these agents make then the same choice, so
that this will be independent of n; and will be described by a portfolio respectively
of ‘individual’ and ‘pool’ securities, µ
h = (::;µ
h





14Since each ’village’ is populated by a …nite number of agents, price taking would not be
justi…ed in fact in an economy with securities’ prices indexed by the name of the ’village’.
12and a consumption plan ch = (ch
0;ch
1 = ch
1(s;¾);s 2 S;¾ 2 §)) 2 <
L(1+S§)
+ : The
consumption plan speci…es the level of consumption at date 0 and at date 1,
for every possible realization of the aggregate uncertainty and the idiosyncratic
uncertainty a¤ecting the agent.
A competitive equilibrium with symmetric information is then a collection of
prices < p0;(p1(¾)¾2§);(qj)j2J >, consumption and portfolio plans for every agen-
t’s type < (ch;(µ
h;µ
h




² agents optimize: for all h 2 H the plan (ch;(µ
h;µ
h













































































p;j) = 0; j 2 J (3.3)
² the payo¤ r
p
j(¾) of each ‘pool’ security satis…es:
r
p
j (¾) = ¡
X
s
¼(s=¾)rj (s;¾); j 2 J;¾ 2 § (3.4)
13Under assumption 1, we have been able to exploit the Law of Large Numbers
to write the feasibility condition for date 1 in (??) in terms of conditional expec-
tations. The market clearing condition for securities (??) is then stated as the
equality of the total position in ’individual’ securities of a given type and the total
position in the associated ’pool’ security. It is easy to show, by using again the
Law of Large Numbers and the above speci…cation of the payo¤ of ’pool’ securities
that this ensures that the aggregate payo¤ of the portfolios held by agents equals
0, for all possible realizations of the uncertainty at date 1, i.e. ensures feasibility.
This formulation of the equilibrium condition for securities implies that trades
among agents of di¤erent index n (across di¤erent ’villages’) take place both by
compensating long and short positions in the same type of security in di¤erent
’villages’ (i.e. by aggregating together their positions in this security) as well as
by compensating their net total position with positions in the associated ’pool’
securities.
It is immediate to see that the set of securities’ prices precluding arbitrage op-
portunities is a non-empty, open set. Moreover, both the agents’ choice problem
Ph
SI and the equilibrium problem are …nite-dimensional and well-behaved prob-
lems. The following result then follows by an application of standard arguments:
Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1-3, a competitive equilibrium with symmetric














for some ½ ´ (::;½¾;::) À 0:
Let R denote the S§ £ J payo¤ matrix, with generic element rj(s;¾); and
Sp[R] the linear space generated by the columns of R. We also have:
Corollary 1. If, in addition, Sp[R] = <S§; competitive equilibria with symmet-
ric information and fair prices are Pareto optimal and such that consumption
allocations only depend on the aggregate shock ¾ (i.e. all idiosyncratic shocks are
fully insured).
When Sp[R] = <S§ we can say therefore that markets are complete and that
the above market structure allows to decentralize Pareto optimal allocations via
securities with exogenously given payo¤. Our result complements the results of
14Magill and Shafer (1992), Cass, Chichilniski and Wu (1996) where, building on
the original analysis of Malinvaud (1972), Pareto optima are decentralized via a
set of mutual insurance contracts. It also con…rms the fact that the restriction
we imposed on agents’ behavior, by preventing them from trading in securities of
di¤erent index n, is not binding.
Remark 2. Though the set of available securities is taken as given and …nancial
intermediaries are not explicitly modelled, competitive intermediaries, who design
and market these securities, could be introduced with no substantial change in
the structure of the model or the de…nition of an equilibrium. In particular,
the economies we study are equivalent to economies in which intermediaries take
positions in individual securities, compensate them across ’villages’, and issue, on
thatbasis, ‘pool’ securities. Intermediariesmaximize pro…ts and act on the basis of
competitive conjectures. The condition we imposed on the price of ’pool’ securities
together with the speci…cation of the market clearing condition for securities imply
then that a zero-pro…t condition holds, at equilibrium, for all intermediaries.
This equivalence between the speci…cation of the model with an exogenously
given set of …nancial markets and the one with competitive, pro…t-maximizing
intermediaries extends to all the following analysis of asymmetric information
economies.
4. Asymmetric Information Economies
In this section asymmetric information is introduced: di¤erent information struc-
tures, leading to di¤erent types of economies with asymmetric information are
presented. We show that in these economies the existence of competitive equi-
libria cannot be proved under the same set of assumptions as with symmetric
information (i.e. assumptions 1-3 are no longer enough to ensure that competi-
tive equilibria exist). The nature of the existence problems is identi…ed, and is
shown to be common to economies with various kinds of informational asymme-
tries. This will provide the basis for the determination of additional conditions
under which general existence results will be proved in section ??.
4.1. Adverse Selection Economy
Consider the case in which:
15² the idiosyncratic shocks (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N are realized at the beginning of date 0,
but the realization of ~ sh;n is privately observed by agent (h;n) and becomes
commonly known only at date 1:
Let the structure of markets be the same as in the previous section. At date
0; markets for the L commodities and securities open. For every n there are
J securities with payo¤ contingent on ((~ sn); ~ ¾); in addition, there are J ’pool’
securities. At date 1; after the realization of ((~ sn)n2N; ~ ¾) becomes known to all
agents, securities liquidate their payo¤ and the commodities are again traded on
spot markets. All markets are perfectly competitive, and we examine …rst the
case in which all prices are restricted to be linear.
With the above information structure the economy will be characterized by
the presence of adverse selection: at date 0 agents trade contingent securities
having di¤erent information over their payo¤. In particular each agent (h;n);
before choosing the level of trade in ‘individual’ securities, knows the realization
of ~ sh;n; i.e. has some information over the payo¤ of these securities.
Since the economy is large and all ’individual’ securities of a given type are
traded together in a single market, the private information of an agent over an
idiosyncratic source of uncertainty will have a negligible impact on the total level
of trades in the market. As a consequence, in the present framework date 0 prices
can only reveal the information contained in aggregate trades, and this can at
most be the component of the aggregate uncertainty which is correlated with the
agents’ signals. Thus no idiosyncratic uncertainty can be revealed at equilibrium,
i.e. the equilibrium will never be fully revealing (di¤erently from Radner (1979)).
For the clarity of the exposition, but clearly with no loss of generality, we will
assume here that the component of the agregate uncertainty which is revealed by
aggregate trades is null, i.e.
² the idiosyncratic shocks (and signals) (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N are independent of ~ ¾ :
¼(s=¾) = ¼(s) 8s;¾:
Thus no information is revealed at a competitive equilibrium.
A formal description of the agents’ problem and a de…nition of competitive
equilibrium for the adverse selection economy is now presented.
Let qj be the price of securities of type j (again, by the assumption of perfect
competition, the same for all n), and ¡qj be the price of the associated ‘pool’
security; q ´ ((qj)j2J); p0 and p1(¾) are commodity spot prices. Moreover, we
will still consider the case in which agent (h;n) is restricted to trade only the
16J securities contingent on his own idiosyncratic shock ~ sn as well as the J ‘pool’
securities.15
Given the assumed information structure the agent will choose the level of
trades at date 0; in securitiesand consumption goods, after learning the realization
sh of ~ sh;n: His portfolio and consumption plans are then contingent on sh: At the
same time his date 1 consumption plan will specify now the level of consumption
for every possible realization of the remaining uncertainty, i.e. for every possible
value s¡h ´ ((sh0)h06=h) of the shocks a¤ecting the other agents, and for every ¾:
See Figure 1:
We will see below that all agents of the same type face the same optimization
problem, that the feasible set is convex, and their objective function is strictly
concave; their optimal choice therefore will be, as in the case of symmetric infor-
mation, identical for all n (and the index n can then be omitted here).
Let S¡h ´ ¦h06=hSh and ¼(s¡h=sh) ´ ¼((~ sh0;n = sh0)h06=h=sh): The consump-
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The unit payo¤ of ‘pool’ security j 2 J is again de…ned by the opposite of the
average total net amount (of the numeraire commodity) due to - or owed by - all
15We should note however that in the presence af asymmetric information this restriction does
not bind only if it is assumed that agents are unable to ’control’ for the identity (in particular
the ’village’) of the partner of each of their transactions, i.e. of whom they are buying or selling
the contract from. In that case ’pool’ securities summarize again all that agents could do if they
were able to trade all ’individual’ securities, including the ones of the other ’villages’.
17agents who traded securities of type j; for all n; this is when the average is well
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(4.1)
Let Rp be the § £ J matrix with generic element r
p
j(¾).
A competitive equilibrium with adverse selection is de…ned by a speci…cation
of the ‘pool’ securities’ payo¤ Rp; a collection of prices (p0;(p1(¾))¾2§);q), and of




sh 2 Sh)h2H such that:
² for all h; the plan (ch(sh);µ
h(sh);µ
h
p(sh);sh 2 Sh) solves (Ph
AS) at the prices
(p0;(p1(¾))¾2§);q) and ‘pool’ securities’ payo¤ Rp;
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² the payo¤ r
p
j(¾) of each ‘pool’ security j satis…es (??), for all ¾.
4.1.1. Why Existence is a Problem with Adverse Selection
The presence of adverse selection, speci…cally the fact that each agent (h;n) trades
securities (of index n) by having some private information over its payo¤, poses
two main problems for the analysis of this economy with respect to the case of
symmetric information considered in section ??.
181. Feasibility. Market clearing for the aggregate positions on ‘individual’ and
the associated ‘pool’ securities (as in condition (??)) is no longer enough to
ensure feasibility of trades in securities.
The problem is that now security holdings, unlike in the case of symmetric
information, are not the same for all agents of the same type h as the
portfolio choice of each agent (h;n) depends on the observed realization sh
of the signal ~ sh;n: Since the payo¤ of the securities purchased also depends
on sh; the individual portfolio choice is then correlated with the return on
the portfolio. As a consequence, the aggregate return on the positions held
by agents in a given contract is no longer a linear function of the total level
of trades in that contract. In particular, condition (??), which is the direct
analogue of the market clearing condition (??) considered for the symmetric
information case, does not ensure that the aggregate payo¤ on securities is 0
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p;j(sh) = 0 (i.e. transactions in


































not be factored out of this sum when µ
h
j(sh) depends non trivially on sh, i.e.
when adverse selection matters.16
The nature of the problem can be clearly seen by considering the following
extreme case. Suppose signal s implies that the return on buying a certain
’individual’ contract will be high, while s0 on the contrary implies that the
return will be low. Then it may happen that agents who received signal s
will buy this contract, while agents who received s0 will sell. In this case,
even if the aggregate position on this type of contract is 0, still in period
1 the agents who bought the contract cannot be paid out of the proceeds





j(sh) = 0, and hence the payo¤ of the ’pool’ can be set at an arbitrary value
in this case, the statement in the text is true no matter what is the payo¤ of the ‘pool’ in this
case.
19from agents who sold it, so that feasibility is not satis…ed.
At a more general level we can view the feasibility problem as arising from
the fact that each of the various contracts of the same type is now a dif-
ferent object not only ex-post (as the realization of the payo¤ depends on
the village) but also ex-ante, as the level of trades by an agent depends on
the speci…c realization of signal received over its payo¤. On the other hand,
with linear prices, only one price exists to clear the market for all these
contracts.
2. Arbitrage. Agents have additional arbitrage opportunities.
With symmetric information the set of securities’ prices precluding arbitrage
is always non-empty and open. On the other hand, when agents have private
information over the support of the payo¤ of securities (as in the situation
we are considering) this set may well be empty.
More precisely, the set:
K(s
h) ´ fq 2 R








denotes the set of prices of the J individual securities precluding arbitrage
opportunities to agents of type h when they observed state sh: Therefore,
for no agent to have any arbitrage opportunity we need:
\
h2H;sh2Sh K(s
h) 6= ; (NA)
The greater the set of securities with payo¤ contingent on (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N;
i.e. the larger the insurance o¤ered against the states over which some
agents have private information, the less likely is that condition (NA) will
be satis…ed. In particular it will always be empty if R has full rank, so that
un-restricted trade in a complete set of markets is not feasible in the present
situation.
Again the nature of the problem can be clearly seen by considering an ex-
treme case. Agents receive di¤erent signals over the future realization of the
idiosyncratic uncertainty, so it may happen that agent (h;n) knows that
some shock realization s is not possible, while some other agent (h0;n) gives
it positive probability. Suppose there is a security paying one unit in state
s and 0 in all other states. No-arbitrage for agent (h0;n) requires that this
security sells at a positive price, while no-arbitrage for agent (h;n) requires
that the security’s price is 0: Hence the no-arbitrage set is empty in this
case.
204.2. Hidden Information Economy
Consider next the case in which:
² the idiosyncratic shocks (~ sh;n)h2H;n2N are realized at date 1 and may be
correlated with ~ ¾ (as in the symmetric information case);
² the realization of ~ sh;n is privately observed by agent (h;n) - before the real-
ization of ~ ¾ is commonly observed - and never becomes known to the other
agents, for all h;n:
Under these conditions contracts with payo¤ directly contingent on ~ sh;n can
no longer be written, as ~ sh;n is private information and never publicly observable.
Thus agents will only be able to get some insurance against their idiosyncratic
shocks as long as this is compatible with their incentives. We will model this by
considering securities whose payo¤ is contingent on what the agents say about the
state, on the messagesthey send after learning the realization of their idiosyncratic
shock.
More precisely, let Mh be the space of messages which an agent of type h
can send. We will assume that Mh is …nite; let Mh also be its cardinality and
denote by mh its generic element (we can have, for instance, Mh = Sh; i.e. each
agent simply announces one of the possible states he has privately observed).
For every n there are so J securities whose payo¤ depends on the realization
of ~ ¾, commonly observed, and on the messages sent by agents of index n over
the realization of (~ sh;n)h2H: One unit of security j; j = 1;::;J pays rj(m;¾)
units of the numeraire commodity at date 1 when state ¾ is realized, and m ´
(m1;:::;mH) 2 M = ¦h2HMh is the collection of messages sent by the H agents
of index n: In addition, there are again J ’pool’ securities, associated with each




Except for this di¤erence in the speci…cation of contracts, the structure of
markets is unchanged. Spot markets for the commodities and securities’ markets
open at date 0; before any realization of the uncertainty. At the beginning of
date 1 agents send their message; the realization of ~ ¾, as well as the messages are
then commonly observed, the payo¤ of contracts is determined and liquidated.
Spot markets subsequently open where the commodities are traded. Markets are
competitive. As in the case of adverse selection we consider …rst the case in
which prices are restricted to be linear; in particular, qj is again the unit price of
securities of type j (and ¡qj the price of the associated ‘pool’ security).
21To ensure that agents are able to observe their own endowment we will also
assume here that:
² the endowment of agent (h;n) depends upon the realization of ~ ¾ and ~ sh;n
only.
Under the present characterization of the individuals’ information structure
and of the nature of the existing securities, agents can exploit their private in-
formation to a¤ect the payo¤ of ’individual’ securities. Though agents have no
private source of information when they trade securities at date 0; they do take
into account their future ability to ’choose’, to a certain extent, the level of the
return on these securities. The markets for such claims are then characterized by
the presence of hidden information17.
Remark 3. We can now see more precisely how the non-triviality of the choice
of the message sent by agents (and hence the fact that indeed some amount of
insurance against the agents’ privately observed states can be achieved) is ensured
by the following features of the information structure:
(a) the correlation of (~ sh;n)h2H across h;
(b) the correlation of ~ sh;n with ~ ¾:
In the presence of (a) the message agent (h;n) will choose to send will not typi-
cally be a constant message (the same for all sh) if the securities’ payo¤ depends
jointly on the messages sent by all agents with the same index n (i.e. by agents
whose private information is correlated). The same is true under (b) if securities’
payo¤s depend on the commonly observed state ¾ as well as on the agents’ mes-
sages and if these are sent by agents before learning the realization of ~ ¾: Both the
joint dependence of security payo¤s on ¾ and the message m sent by all agents
with the same index n as well as the fact that agents’ messages have to be sent
before the realization of ~ ¾ is commonly observed are important then to ensure
that we have non trivial message choices.
The fact that correlation may induce some discipline on the agents’ opportunistic
17The very close similarity with the classical case of moral hazard, where agents can a¤ect
the distribution of securities’ payo¤s via some unobservable action, should be now more evident.
The crucial distinction between adverse selection economies on one side, and hidden information
as well as moral hazard economies on the other, lies in the fact that in the …rst case the
informational asymmetry arises before the contract is signed, while in the latter agents have
no private information when their trades in securities are decided, asymmetric information only
arises at a later date (see also Hart and Holmstrom (1987)).
22behavior and so enhance incentives is well-known in the moral hazard literature:
(a) can be viewed as an abstract representation of a situation of relative perfor-
mance evaluation (see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)), while an application of the
idea behind (b) can be found in Townsend (1982). As it will appear more clear
later, in the present framework, where the contracts traded are standardized con-
tracts and strong exclusivity conditions may not be (are not) enforceable, the only
incentive compatible choice is a trivial one if neither (a) nor (b) hold (equivalently,
the agents’ optimal message will be constant if securities’ payo¤ only depends on
~ sh;n).
Let us describe now the agents’ choice problem and de…ne competitive equi-
libria for economies with hidden information.
Each agent (h;n) faces here the following optimization problem. He has
to choose (i) his date 0 consumption level c
h;n
0 2 <L




p ) 2 <2J; (ii) the message plan mh;n ´ (mh;n(sh)sh2SS) 2 (Mh)Sh; speci-
fying the message to send at the beginning of date 1; for every possible realization




1 (¾;m¡h;sh);¾ 2 §;m¡h 2
M¡h;sh 2 Sh) 2 <L§M¡hSh
+ ; specifying the level of consumption for every possible
realization sh of his idiosyncratic uncertainty, ¾ of the aggregate shock, and every
possible collection of messages m¡h ´ ((mh0)h06=h) sent by agents of other types:
The timing of an agent’s choices is illustrated in Figure 1.
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18By requiring ch;n 2 <
L(1+§M¡hSh)
+ we are implicitly imposing the condition that the level
of consumption of agent (h;n) has to lie in the consumption set for every possible message of
agents of type h0 6= h, even though some of these messages may be given zero probability by
¼(m¡h=s¡h): This may appear unduly restrictive, in particular when markets are incomplete,
and is mainly motivated by reasons of technical convenience.
23where ¼(¾;m¡h;sh) ´
P
s¡h ¼(s;¾)¼(m¡h=s¡h) and ¼(m¡h=s¡h) ´ ¦h06=h¼(mh0=sh0)
describes the probability distribution over the messages sent by agents of types
h0 6= h for every possible realization of their idiosyncratic uncertainty.
The agent’s optimization problem P h
HI is now a non-convex problem: the
agent’s choice set is clearly not convex since Mh is a discrete set. But even if the
agent were allowed to randomize in his choice of which message to send for every
realization sh; his problem would still be not convex (as in that case the objective
function is not concave). The fact that agents can choose both the unit payo¤
(via their message) and the quantity traded of each ’individual’ security generates
in fact an inherent non-convexity in their choice problem. We will show that the
economy can be ‘convexi…ed’ by exploiting the large number of agents.19 This
requires that ex-ante identical agents behave di¤erently at equilibrium, i.e. may
end up choosing, at equilibrium, di¤erent levels of trades and di¤erent messages
(this explains why we could no longer omit here the index n in the speci…cation
of the agents’ problem Ph
HI). As a consequence, even though each agent chooses
to send a single message in each state, the distribution over the possible messages
sent by agents of each given type h as a function of their state, ¼(mh=sh); will be
non-degenerate.
In particular, we will showthat it isenough to consider the case in which agents
of the same type will make at most an arbitrarily large but …nite20 number V of
di¤erent choices at equilibrium, denoting by ch;º;µ
h;º;µ
h;º
p ;mh;º the º-th choice of
agents of type h and by °h;º the fraction of agents of this type making such choice,
º = 1;::;V:
A competitive equilibrium with hidden information is de…ned by a speci…ca-
tion of the payo¤ of ‘pool’ securities Rp; an array of prices (p0;(p1(¾))¾2§;q),
a collection of consumption, portfolio, and message plans for agents of type h
19The presence of non-convexities often characterizes agents’ problems in the presence of
moral hazard. Another route to overcome such di¢culties is followed by Prescott and Townsend
(1984a); in their set-up the space of admissible individual choices is enlarged to allow for lotteries;
the convexi…cation is so introduced at the level of the individuals’ demand. Kehoe, Levine and
Prescott (1998) have recently shown, for the economy considered by Prescott and Townsend,
that essentially the same equilibria obtain if sunspot uncertainty is introduced instead; as shown
by Shell and Wright (1993) sunspots provide generally another way to ’convexify’ an economy,
again at the level of the economy. See Garratt, Keister, Qin and Shell (1997) for a more complete
discussion of the relations among these various routes to deal with non-convexities.
20In this case the Law of Large Numbers can still be exploited in the feasibility conditions.
We will show that equilibria satisfying such condition always exist. However, there may also be
other equilibria which violate it.




p ;mh;º;°h;º)º2V; and probability distributions over other types’ mes-
sages (¼(m¡h=s¡h)s¡h2S¡h)h2H; for all h, such that:
² for every h all plans (ch;º;µ
h;º;µ
h;º
p ;mh;º)º2V are solutions of (Ph
HI) at the
prices (p0;(p1(¾))¾2§;q); ‘pool’ securities’ payo¤ Rp; and distribution over
other agents’ message strategies (¼(m¡h=s¡h))s¡h2S¡h;
² for all h (¼(m¡h=s¡h))s¡h2S¡h is consistent with the frequency of the strate-
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25² °h;º ¸ 0;
P
º °h;º = 121
Since the payo¤ of the ’individual’ securities traded by agent (h;n) may de-
pend, as well as on his message, on the message sent by agents of di¤erent type,
but with the same index n; a strategic element is introduced in the agent’s choice
problem. Condition (??) requires the consistency of what agent (h;n) considers
to be the probability distribution over messages of agents of other types with the
actual frequencies of these messages in the population. It ensures that, as a com-
ponent of the above equilibrium notion, we have a Nash equilibrium in the agents’
message game. The fact that it is the distribution over message choices in the
whole population to be considered, follows from the anonymity property of this
game (agents do not know the precise identity, and hence the message strategy,
of the agents in the population characterized by their same index n; and can only
base their behavior on the strategy of the population average):
The payo¤ of ‘pool’ securities is also endogenously determined, as in the case
of symmetric information and adverse selection economies, by the portfolio choices
of all agents in the population. However, since the direct e¤ect of each individual
agent on the ’pool’s payo¤ is negligible, this is taken as given by each agent.
4.2.1. Why Existence is a Problem with Hidden Information
The main problems posed by the presence of hidden information for the viability
of markets for contingent contracts are the same as the ones we found under
adverse selection:
1. Feasibility. The non-convexity in the agents’ choice problem implies, as we
noticed, that ex-ante identical agents may choose, at equilibrium, di¤erent
portfolios and di¤erent messages. As a consequence, the payo¤ of a security
will depend (non-linearly) on what is the portfolio choice of the agent. We
face so again the problem that the fact that the market clearing condition
for securities is satis…ed does not imply that the aggregate payo¤ will also
21We allow °h = (°h;v)v2V to be any real vector in the simplex ¢V ¡1 even though, with
countably many agents we should limit our attention to rational numbers. Since rational num-
bers are dense in the reals, the equilibrium we obtain is, strictly speaking, an approximate
equilibrium. To overcome this fact we could have considered, without any change in the nature
of the results, the case of a continuum of agents, as in Aumann (1966), and made appeal to the
results by Al-Najjar (1995) and Yeneng (1998) on the Law of Large Numbers in such framework.
26be 0:

































hence the total payo¤ may not be 0. We see in fact, from expression (??),
that the message sent by an arbitrary agent of type h; mh;v; depends on
the speci…c level of trades of this agent, (µ
h;v;ch;v); and that the aggregate
return is a non-linear function of the total level of trades, so that again
aggregate portfolios and payo¤s cannot be separated.22
The argument parallels exactly the one of the previous section for adverse
selection economies. The intuition is also essentially the same: we can
have agents who, having bought a security, send a message implying a high
payo¤, while agents who sold the same security send a message inducing a
low payo¤, so that on the whole total payo¤ is not 0; and feasibility is not
satis…ed.
2. Arbitrage. The fact that the agents can a¤ect the payo¤ of the securities
via the choice of their message (have the possibility to determine, to some
extent, the support of securities’ payo¤s) gives them additional arbitrage
opportunities.
More precisely, the set of prices of the J ‘individual’ securities precluding
arbitrage opportunities to agents of type h is given by:
K
h ´ fq 2 R













h 6= ; (NA0)
22On the other hand, if all agents of the same type h make the same choice of portfolios and
messages, i.e. if µ
h;v;mh;v do not depend on v; it is immediate to see from the expression in
(??) that total returns will be a linear function of trades:
27It is easy to see that, as for adverse selection economies, there is a trade-o¤
between the aim of ensuring larger insurance opportunities, thus requir-
ing that securities’ payo¤ are non-trivially a¤ected by the agents’ message
choices, and the need of preventing arbitrage opportunities.
On the other hand, no speci…c, additional problems are caused by the non-
convexity of the agents’ choice problem. In economies with hidden information,
non-convexities are then a source of di¢culties for existence only in the sense
that they induce the same correlation of portfolios and returns which was at the
root of the problems we have identi…ed for adverse selection economies. We will
show in the next section that existence for economies with hidden information
can be established under essentially the same conditions as for adverse selection
economies.
Remark 4. At a more abstract level we can view the main consequence of the
presence of asymmetric information in markets for contingent contracts as the
induced correlation of portfolios and returns, i.e. the fact that the e¤ective re-
turn on a contract of a given type is not constant throughout the economy, and
the quantity traded will typically be di¤erent for di¤erent levels of the return.
This feature is indeed common both to adverse selection and hidden information
economies (as well as moral hazard economies) and is the source of the existence
problems we discussed. In particular, while with adverse selection these di¤erences
in the returns to agents trading a contract derive from the exogenously given de-
pendence on s of the payo¤ (and the way agents’ portfolios vary as a function
of s is endogenously determined), with hidden information both the probability
structure of portfolios and of returns (via the message choice), i.e. their depen-
dence on v; are endogenously chosen. This explains the sense in which adverse
selection economies can be viewed in our framework as a reduced form of hidden
information economies.
5. A Non-Existence Example
In the previous section we identi…ed two classes of problems for the existence of
competitive equilibria, concerning the aggregate feasibility of trades in ’individual’
contracts and the presence of arbitrage opportunities. We present here a robust
example of an adverse selection economy for which no competitive equilibrium
28exists, and we argue that the reason for the non-existence is indeed the feasibility
problem described above.23
Consider an economy with one commodity (L = 1) and countably many agents
all of the same type (H = 1): Consumption only takes place at date 1: There is
no aggregate uncertainty (§ = 1). The idiosyncratic shocks have two possible
realizations, 1;2; and each agent receives one out of two equiprobable signals at
date 0: g or b: Let ¼g ´ ¼(1=g) and ¼b ´ ¼(1=b) be the probability of (idio-
syncratic) state 1 conditional respectively on signal g and signal b:24 We assume
that w(1) > w(2) and ¼g > ¼b; hence agents who receive signal g qualify as the
‘good risks’ (i.e. have a higher probability of the good realization of their future
income) and agents with signal b as the ‘bad risks’. Agents have Von Neumann-
Morgernstern preferences over consumption with utility function of the following
form: lnc:
After learning his signal but before knowing the realization of his idiosyncratic
uncertainty, each agent can trade two securities, 1;2. Security 1 pays one unit
of the commodity when the agent’s idiosyncratic state is 1. Similarly security 2
pays one unit of the commodity in idiosyncratic state 2. Let q and 1 ¡ q denote
the (normalized) prices of, respectively, security 1 and 2:
The budget constraint of an agent who received signal g is then:25
µ1(g)q + µ2(g)(1 ¡ q) = 0:
Similarly for agents who received signal b:
The agents’ utility maximization problem subject to the above constraint can
be easily solved in this case and yields an explicit expression of the demand for
consumption in the two idiosyncratic states (respectively for agents receiving sig-
23It is easy to construct examples where equilibria do not exist because agents, as a conse-
quence of their private information, have unbounded arbitrage opportunities.
24Though the structure here of the idiosyncratic uncertainty and of the agents’ signals may
appear slightly di¤erent from the one described in the previous section, the present economy
could have also been written, at the cost of some extra notational burden, precisely in terms of
that same structure.
25In the present set-up, since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the total return on the agents’
positions in an ’individual’ security, and hence the payo¤ of the associated ’pool’ security, will
always be deterministic. Agents will then always be able to replicate the ’pool’ ’s payo¤ (or
perfectly hedge it) by trading the two ’individual’ securities. ‘Pool’ securities are then redundant
here and need not be explicitly modelled, as long as we do not impose a separate market clearing
condition for each individual security (see however the …nal section).






















The market-clearing condition for the commodity is26 :
c(1;g)¼g + c(1;b)¼b + (1 ¡ ¼g)c(2;g) + (1 ¡ ¼b)c(2;b) (5.2)
= w(1)¼g + w(1)¼b + (1 ¡ ¼g)w(2) + (1 ¡ ¼b)w(2)
A competitive equilibrium is then given by a price q and a consumption vector c
such that (??);(??) hold.
For this economy the set of no-arbitrage prices is non-empty, and is given by
all prices q 2 (0;1). We will show that, nonetheless, for an open set of parameters,
a competitive equilibrium does not exist.
The excess demand function (equivalently the overall pro…t function) we obtain














It is easy to see in fact, fromthe expressions of the agents’ demand, that in the …rst
case agents will be buying insurance, no matter what is the signal received, and
will do this at more than fair terms, while the opposite happens in the second case,







(1¡¼g)) the sign of aggregate demand cannot be
unambiguously determined without further restrictions on the parameter values
of the economy. In the next paragraph we present an open set of parameter values
for which aggregate excess demand is negative also at all intermediate prices, so
that no competitive equilibrium exists. Notice that this fact is a clear consequence
of the feasibility problem we discussed in the previous section.
Consider then the following speci…cation of the parameters of the economy:





(1¡¼b) reduces to ² > 0:3: Solving equations (??) and (??)
26This is also equivalent to the requirement that the sum of the total payo¤s on the two
existing securities equal zero, i.e. can be viewed as an overall zero-pro…t condition.








c(2;b) = :64½ + :16
q
1¡q = ½
where ½ takes one of the two following values:
½ =
³
40 + 75²¡ 125²2 §
p
(576 + 2160² ¡ 11575²2 ¡ 6750²3 + 5625²4)
´
2(128 ¡ 160² + 100²2)
Straightforward computations reveal that, whenever ² > 0:3; no real-valued so-
lution exists27 for equilibrium prices and consumption, i.e. an equilibrium never
exists in this region. It is then immediate to see that perturbing the values of the
parameters does not restore existence, so equilibria fail to exist for an open set of
parameter values.




(1¡¼b), aggregate demand is always




(1¡¼b): agents receiving signal b buy insurance at fair
terms, while agents with signal g also buy insurance but at less than fair terms, so
that total pro…ts (and hence excess demand) will be positive. By the continuity of
the excess demand function therefore it follows that an equilibrium always exists
in this region. In particular, for the same speci…cation of the parameter values
as above (w(1) = 0:8;w(2) = 0:2;¼b = :2; and ¼g = 0:2 + ²) two admissible
equilibrium solutions exist, as we already saw, when ² < 0:3. Moreover, it can be
easily seen that these two competitive equilibria are always Pareto ranked.
To better understand the properties of the set of competitive equilibria we
obtain in this economy, consider the equilibrium solutions when ² = 0 (in this
case the signal received by the agents is totally uninformative, information is then
symmetric):








27The term 576+2160²¡ 11575²2¡6750²3+5625²4 has in fact a negative value when ² > 0:3:
31The equilibrium in (i) is characterized by the presence of full insurance at fair
prices (and is, evidently, Pareto e¢cient), while equilibrium (ii) has a zero level
of trades for all agents.
Since the equilibrium values we obtained for consumption and prices are con-
tinuous functions of ²; the two equilibria we have with adverse selection when
an equilibrium exists, i.e. when 0:3 > ² > 0, arise by continuity from these two
equilibria, the Pareto e¢cient and the no trade solution of the economy with
symmetric information (for ² = 0):
6. Existence Results
The previous example shows that, with respect to the case in which information
is symmetric, additional conditions are needed in economies with asymmetric
information to overcome the problems discussed in section ?? and guarantee the
existence of competitive equilibria. In particular, some restrictions have to be
imposed on the agents’ trades, or on the structure of payo¤s, or equivalently some
form of non-linearity in prices must be introduced in markets characterized by the
presence of hidden information or adverse selection. This, as well as the fact that
securities’ payo¤s are partly determined by the agents’ actions (thus re‡ecting
their incentive compatibility constraints), implies that asymmetric information
generates an endogenous limit on the set of insurance possibilities which can be
attained via competitive markets.
In this section we focus our attention on ’minimal’ forms of non-linearity of
prices of contracts (in the sense that they impose a minimal observability require-
ment) which are su¢cient to guarantee existence of competitive equilibria in the
class of economies studied; see Remark 5 below.
To overcome the ’feasibility’ problem we will impose the condition that agents
are constrained to take only long positions in ‘individual’ securities (e.g. that they






where £h denotes the set of admissible trades in ’individual’ securities. It is
immediate to see that under (C1) the market clearing condition for securities
always ensures feasibility of the trades in securities. In the adverse selection




















thus ensuring feasibility also when the total position in’ ’individual’ securities is
0 (the same argument obviously holds in the case of hidden information).
To prevent the possibility of unlimited arbitrage opportunities arising from
the agents’ private information we will consider here the case where trades in
’individual’ securities cannot be unboundedly large. Alternatively, restrictions on
the payo¤s of existing securities could have been imposed, ensuring that condition
(NA) ((NA0)) is satis…ed, i.e. that the set of no arbitrage prices is non-empty.
The validity of all our results extends to such case.28
More precisely, the following condition will be imposed:29
(i) µ
h 2 £h; a compact and convex subset of <J; s.t. 0 2 £h 8h
(ii) Sp[(
P
s »srj(s;¾))¾;j] = <§ 8(::;»s;::) 2 ¢S¡1 (C2)
where (
P
s »srj(s;¾))¾;j is the matrix with generic element (
P
s »srj(s;¾)) and
¢S¡1 is the (S ¡ 1)¡ dimensional simplex.
Condition (C2(i)) requires that agents’ admissible trades in all ‘individual’
securities are bounded both above and below. Evidently, if this condition holds
no agent can ever have unbounded arbitrage opportunities arising from his private
information. On the other hand, no restriction is imposed on the agents’ trades
in ‘pool’ securities (for which there is no private information). Recalling that the
price of each ‘pool’ security equals the opposite of the price of the underlying
security, by a standard argument we obtain that the non-empty open set
Q(R
p) = fq 2 <
J : 9½ 2 <
§
++; q = ¡(R
p)
0½g (6.1)
28It should also be clear from our previous discussion that, if the agents’ private information is
not over the support of the securities’ payo¤ but only over their probability distribution, neither
of these conditions is needed.
29The condition as stated here applies to adverse selection economies. In the case of economies
with hidden information, the only di¤erence is that in (C2(ii)) s should be replaced with m:
33characterizes the set of prices for which there are no arbitrage opportunities.
Since the payo¤ of ’pool’ securities is endogenously determined at equilibrium
(and there are no restrictions on trades in these securities), the agents’ budget cor-
respondence may fail to be continuous. Condition (C2(ii)) ensures that this never
happens.30 It says that any convex combination of the payo¤s of the ’individual’
securities for the di¤erent values of s; for any given ¾; has full rank:31 It implies,
when (C1) is also imposed, that whatever the level of agents’ trades in ’individual’
securities, we always have Sp[Rp] = <§: Hence when (C2(ii)) holds, agents are
able to attain all possible payo¤s contingent on ¾ by trading in ‘pool’ securities,
so that markets are always complete with respect to the aggregate uncertainty in
the economy.
We show in the Appendix that under (C2) the agents’ choice problem has
always a solution and this is well-behaved, both with adverse selection and hidden
information.
We will refer in what follows to the restrictions imposed by (C1);(C2) as
One-Side Constraints.
As an alternative to (C1) we will also consider the case in which agents are
allowed to go both long and short in ‘individual’ securities but di¤erent prices
are quoted for long and short positions (i.e. bid-ask spreads are allowed). More
precisely, letting q(µj) denote the cost of trading µj units of security j; we have,
for all j 2 J:
µj ¸ 0 ) q(µj) = qb
jµj





j are respectively the unit buying and selling price of ’individual’
security j; j 2 J; and (C10) says that these prices may di¤er.
We will refer to conditions (C10);(C2) as Bid-Ask Spreads.
This situation can be analyzed in our set-up by assuming that for each ’indi-
vidual’ security there is another ’individual’ security with opposite, but otherwise
identical, payo¤ (so that taking long positions in this claim corresponds to tak-
ing a short position in the ’individual’ security). We have then distinct ’pool’
30Evidently, the continuity of the agents’ budget set is also ensured if, in alternative to
(C2(ii)); we impose the condition that trades in all (not just the ’individual’) securities have to
lie in a compact set.
31Su¢cient condition for this property to hold is obviously the existence of a subset of ’indi-
vidual’ securities with payo¤ only contingent on ¾; spanning the whole aggregate uncertainty.
34securities, as well as distinct prices, associated with these securities, i.e. with the
agents’ long and short positions in the underlying claim. Therefore, the model
with Bid-Ask Spreads can be formally reduced to a model with One-Side Con-
straints (and an expanded set of securities). By the same argument as above it
follows that (C10) also allows to overcome the feasibility problem.
Remark 5. The introduction of any form of trading restriction, or non-linearity
of prices, requires some observability of agents’ trades in …nancial markets. We
already commented in the Introduction on the very strong informational require-
ments needed to implement exclusivity conditions, or general non-linear price
schedules. We intend to argue here that the implementation of one-side con-
straints as in condition (C1), or of bid-ask spreads as in condition (C10), poses
observability requirements which are, qualitatively, minimally demanding. Only
the level of trades in the particular transaction being made has in fact to be ob-
served to implement a constraint on the sign of the total level of trade in securities
by an individual (as in the case of one-side constraints), or a variation of the unit
price at a zero level of total trades (as in the case of bid-ask spreads). On the
contrary, for constraints or price changes at any level of trades di¤erent from zero
the whole set of transactions in one market (and possibly more) would need, in
principle, to be observed.
On the other hand the imposition of bounds on trade requires essentially the
observation of ‘large’ portfolios, a stronger but natural requirement.
Remark 6. Condition (C1) implies that buyers and sellers are clearly separated
in the markets for securities. In each market we have on one side the buyers of a
given type of ’individual’ security, on the other the agents holding positions in the
associated ’pool’ security. Therefore, no direct compensation of the positions in
a given security in di¤erent villages is possible under this condition, and the only
contingent trades among agents of di¤erent villages take place via their trades in
’pool’ securities. With bid-ask spreads buyers and sellers are also separated (as
they face a di¤erent price), but some compensation of positions is possible in this
case.
More generally, we can view the ’feasibility’ problem as arising from the fact
that a direct compensation of the positions in a given security is not su¢cient to
ensure the feasibility of trades in that security. Hence the need to specify how,
for all possible levels of trade, the losses arising in correspondence of the pro…ts
agents make by trading securities on the basis of their private information are
35distributed in the economy, and hence feasibility ensured.32 Conditions (C1) and
(C10) imply some partially di¤erent mechanisms for distributing these losses.
We will show that, with the additional restrictions imposed by One-Side Con-
straints (or by Bid-Ask Spreads)33, competitive equilibria always exist, both for
economies with adverse selection and with hidden information. We consider then
…rst the case in which conditions (C1);(C2) hold.
By restricting agents to be all on one side of the market for ‘individual’ securi-
ties, condition (C1) generate the possibility of a ’trivial’ solution to the existence
problem. We can always …nd in fact a level of q su¢ciently high (or low according
to the sign of the security’s payo¤) such that no agent wants to buy any ‘indi-
vidual’ security, i.e. µ
h = 0; 8h: At such prices no trade takes place in markets
characterized by the presence of asymmetric information, and the economy re-
duces so to a standard economy with incomplete security markets, where agents
trade under conditions of symmetric information in all markets.
The following theorem however establishes a stronger result than the existence
of competitive equilibria: the existence of equilibriawhere prices satisfy a ’fairness’
property. In particular, we will show that a competitive equilibrium always exists
where the price of each ‘individual’ security has the property of being (weakly)
more than fair for some agent and (weakly) less than fair for some other agent.
By fair for an agent we mean here that the idiosyncratic shock component of a
security’s payo¤ is evaluated fairly, i.e. its value is set equal to its expectation,
conditionally on the private information of the agent.
In the case of economies with adverse selection the fairness property of prices












h;h 2 Hg (FAS)





tutes a price of security j which is fair, in the above sense, for the agents of type
h who observed sh: Evidently, if equilibrium prices satisfy this property, at least
some agent will choose a positive level of trade in each ’individual’ security, i.e.
the equilibrium will typically not be ’trivial’.
32Or, equivalently, so as to ensure the validity of a zero-pro…t condition for intermediaries.
33Our previous analysis also shows that these conditions are tight, i.e. existence is not ensured
if they are relaxed.




















m¡h ¼(m¡h=s¡h)rj(¾;mh(sh);m¡h) constitutes a fair
price of security j for agents of type h who follow message strategy mh: Since mes-
sage strategies are endogenously chosen by agents, in (FHI) prices are required to
be fair only with respect to those message pro…les actually chosen at equilibrium,
i.e. (mh;À)º2V, typically a subset of (Mh)Sh. However, if µh = 0 agent h is indif-
ferent among all the possible messages he can send; we will use then a condition
in the spirit of ’trembling hand perfection’ to impose restrictions on the possible
message strategies at equilibrium of agents who choose a zero level of trades, and
hence further restrict equilibrium prices.34
The validity of such fairness property follows, as we will see more clearly in
the Appendix, from the observation that, under (C1); the range of the map which
determines the payo¤ of ’pool’ securities ((??) in the case of adverse selection
and (??) with hidden information) lies in the same set for every nonzero level of
trade in ’individual’ securities. This set is given in particular by the convex hull
of the expectations of the payo¤ of ’individual’ securities, , over the idiosyncratic
uncertainty, conditionally on all possible signals received by agents. Prices are
then directly related to the level of the payo¤ of ’pool’ securities’.
We can now state the main result (the proof is in the Appendix):
Theorem 2. Under assumptions 1-3, and conditions (C1);(C2) (i.e. with One-
Side Constraints); a competitive equilibrium with fair prices (satisfying, respec-
tively, (FAS);(FHI)) always exists, both for economies with adverse selection and
with hidden information.
As argued above, the model with Bid-Ask Spreads can always be reduced,
formally, to one with One-Side Constraints, so that existence of competitive equi-
libria with Bid-Ask Spreads obtains as a corollary of the previous result:
Corollary 2. Under assumptions 1-3, and conditions (C10);(C2) (i.e. with Bid-
Ask Spreads); a competitive equilibrium with fair prices exists, both for economies
with adverse selection and with hidden information.
34See the Appendix for a formal treatment of this argument; also Gale (1992) and Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik (1995) for discussions of re…nements in similar environments.
37Bid-ask spreads are endogenously determined at equilibrium as the di¤erence
between the price for long and short positions. It is immediate to see that in
the present framework the equilibrium level of the bid-ask spread will always be
non-negative, and typically positive, when information is asymmetric (while it is
zero under symmetric information). The presence of a bid-ask spread is then to
be imputed to the agents’ private information over the payo¤ of securities, and
the need to ensure feasibility in this case - or equivalently a zero-pro…t condition
for intermediaries.35
With One-Side Constraints the losses arising from the fact agents’ trades un-
der private information are distributed to the buyers of ’pool’ securities: the
payo¤ of ’pool’ securities is typically lower than the expected value of the payo¤
of the associated ’individual’ securities36 (where the expectation is taken over the
idiosyncratic uncertainty component). On the other hand, under symmetric in-
formation the return on ’pool’ securities was always equal to this expected value
(see (??)). In the presence of bid-ask spreads, the di¤erence between the price
faced by buyers and sellers constitutes then another way, in addition to the e¤ects
on the ’pool’s payo¤, in which losses can be distributed in the economy.
Remark 7. Various examples can be found of …nancial markets whose features
resemble the properties of the economy we described and the ones implied by con-
ditions (C2) and (C1), or (C10). The securitization of the payo¤s of standardized
contracts (as is observed, e.g. for residential and commercial mortgages, loans,
credit card receivables, and many others; see Kendall and Fishman (1996)) can be
viewed as an instance of the creation of ’pool’ securities. Credit markets usually
have then borrowers on one side and, on the other side, suppliers of funds holding
‘pool’ securities (depositors, or more generally holders of claims issued by inter-
mediaries). Similarly, in insurance markets we observe standardized (insurance)
contracts which agents can only buy, and ’securitized’ claims issued by insurance
companies. The mortgage market is yet another example. A somewhat di¤erent
situation characterizes the stock market and markets for derivative securities. In
these cases, agents may often take both long and short positions, and market
35A similar role of bid-ask spreads has been earlier shown by Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
These authors examine a speci…c intermediation model, with risk-neutral market-makers, and
study the equilibrium of the market for one security, in the presence of adverse selection. It is
interesting to notice that in this model market-makers play, e¤ectively, the same role as ’pool’
securities in our framework.
36Evidently, this will also be re‡ected on the equilibrium level of prices.
38makers charge spreads to guarantee themselves zero pro…ts in the presence of
asymmetric information.
7. Conclusions
In the …nal section we discuss some important issues which arise from our analy-
sis of existence of competitive equilibria for asymmetric information economies.
We refer to the adverse selection economy just for the ease of the discussion, but
without loss of generality.
The role of pool securities. We have assumed throughout the paper that
associated to each ’individual’ security j 2 J there is a ’pool’ security, with re-
turn given by the opposite of the average total net amount due to agents who
traded the security. With One-Side Constraints, if ’pool’ securities were not avail-
able, no trade would clearly be the only feasible allocation. Furthermore, in our
set-up ’pool’ securities constitute the only way in which contingent trades among
agents of di¤erent index n (across di¤erent ’villages’) take place: market clearing
is obtained by compensating positions in ’individual’ securities with positions in
the associated ’pool’ security.
However ’pool’ securities also play another, less evident role by allowing for
the possibility of compensating positions in securities of di¤erent types. To see
this, consider the case in which ’pool’ securities are not available and One-Side
Constraints are not imposed, so that a nonzero level of trade is possible. Then,
as we showed, a competitive equilibrium may not exist, but if it existed it would
be characterized by the fact that long positions in each security are matched by















This is unduly restrictive. Even though di¤erent ’individual’ securities may not
exhibit collinearities in their returns at the level of an agent’s trades, they may do
so when their aggregate return is concerned37. On the other hand, in the market


















37This was clearly the case in the example considered in section 5, where the aggregate return
on both securities was deterministic.
39since the distribution of the demand among collinear ’pool ’ securities is indeter-
minate the compensation of positions in these di¤erent securities is allowed.
We should also stress that, as we already argued, if markets are su¢ciently
complete, the average total payo¤ to agents holding positions in ’individual’ se-
curities can be perfectly hedged on the existing markets and the explicit presence
of ’pool’ securities is no longer needed.
Restrictions on trades and prices. Another feature of the market struc-
ture we considered is the fact that every agent is not allowed to directly trade
’individual’ securities with index n di¤erent from his own. Any such trade has
to be mediated by positions in the associated ’pool’ securities. With symmetric
information, since the ’characteristics’ of the contract being traded are the same
in all ’villages’, this restriction never binds; hence ’pool’ securities properly sum-
marize all what agents could do by trading in other ’villages’. In the presence of
asymmetric information the same is true, as we already argued, as long as agents
are unable to determine the precise index (the ’village’) of the partners of each
of their transactions. The characteristics of the contracts are no longer the same
in each ’village’ at the time in which markets open; thus if agents were able to
obtain a portfolio with the same position in each village n, this would allow them
to avoid the adverse selection problem and achieve a payo¤ which re‡ects the
average ’characteristics’ in the population. This typically dominates the payo¤ of
the ’pool’ security (which is, as we saw, below the population average); markets
would then unravel.
The restriction that securities’ price are identical across villages and equal to
the opposite of the price of the pool securities, q = ¡qp would obtain then as a no
arbitrage condition if agents were allowed to trade, under the above informational
assumptions, in all markets for ’individual’ securities. Such restriction would also
obtain as a zero pro…t condition if intermediaries, taking positions in ’individual’
securities and issuing, on that basis, ’pool’ securities were modelled.
A more explicit analysis of the informational assumptions behind the pricing
structure considered here would clearly bene…t from the examination of a model
with strategic intermediaries and of its limit behavior. This is clearly an impor-
tant open issue.
How general is the existence result ? In this paper we have shown that,
at the root of the di¢culties for the ’viability’ of markets in economies with asym-
metric information, is the fact that whenever agents’ types cannot be separated,
40what are e¤ectively di¤erent contracts are restricted to trade at the same price.
As a consequence, our results apply to more general (and abstract) economies
where several di¤erent goods are restricted to trade at the same price. Such a
situation characterizes various other types of economies with asymmetric informa-
tion, as Akerlof’s ’lemons’ model, but also other circumstances where asymmetric
information is not the source of the problem: for instance electricity prices are
often restricted not to vary at di¤erent times of the day, many commodity prices
are ’sticky’ over time (because, e.g., of menu costs; see Akerlof and Yellen (1985));
segregation and local public goods are other examples.38
To illustrate this claim, consider a simple economy with 4 commodities and
H consumers, and suppose that the …rst three commodities must trade at the
same price: p1 = p2 = p3 = p: Clearly this economy has in general no competitive
equilibrium, as there are not enough prices to clear all markets. Consider then
the following conditions:
i) in the markets for commodities 1;2;3 agents can only buy, not sell, these goods
(i.e. one-side constraints are imposed);
ii) there also exists a market where …xed bundles composed of ® units of good 1;
¯ units of good 2; and (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯) units of good 3 can be both bought and sold,
at the price p (i.e. a ’pool’ of the commodities whose prices are restricted is also
marketed);
iii) the proportions of the various goods in this bundle (i.e. the terms ® and ¯),















l is the amount of good l;l = 1;2;3; purchased by agent h in the market
for this good.
By a fairly immediate reformulation of our earlier argument we can show that
under the above conditions feasibility can be ensured and competitive equilibria
always exist for this economy.
The one-side constraint (or bid-ask spread) conditions are tight, in the sense
that they cannot be relaxed without generating problems for existence. However
other conditions which allow to overcome the existence problems we identi…ed,
and in particular the feasibility problem, could be explored. For instance the
introduction of entry fees, which agents are required to pay to be able to trade
in markets for ’individual’ securities, and are endogenously determined at equi-
librium, allows to prove the existence of competitive equilibria even with linear
prices and no short-sale restrictions. In this case there is no separation between
38See Balasko (1997) for a related analysis of a model with price restrictions.
41buyers and sellers and the entry fee operates as a mechanism, symmetric on the
two sides of the market, to redistribute the losses arising from the presence of
asymmetric information so as to ensure feasibility. In this respect, bankruptcy
institutions, or sets of taxes and transfers, could also serve the same purpose and
ensure existence.
An analysis of the di¤erent implications for the nature of markets under asym-
metric information and in particular for the e¢ciency properties of competitive
equilibria of these alternative conditions, as well as of the forms of non-linearities
of prices which can be implemented when some information on agents’ trades is
easily available, constitutes an important objective of our future work.
42Figure 1: Timing.
43Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2
We will show …rst that under (C2) the agents’ optimization problem has a
well-behaved solution. It is immediate to see that condition (C2(ii)) implies that,
when agents are restricted to take only long positions in ’individual’ securities, the
matrix Rp of the values of the payo¤ of ’pool’ securities obtained from (??) is such
that we always have Sp[Rp] = <§: This shows, since trades in ‘pool’ securities are
unrestricted, that agents can indeed obtain any payo¤ which is contingent only
on the aggregate uncertainty, i.e. that markets are complete with regard to the
aggregate risk. Agents’ behavior isthen una¤ected by changesin Rp at equilibrium
(so this term can be omitted from the arguments of the demand correspondence).
In addition, we use (??) to replace q with ¡(Rp)0½ so that demand can be written
as a function simply of (½;p0;p1) (and, with hidden information, of ¼(m¡h=:)):
Lemma A. 1. Under assumptions 1-3 and (C2), the individual choice prob-
lem Ph
AS has a solution for all (½;p0;p1) 2 <§
++ £ <
L(1+§)
++ and all the values















































The same properties, with the only exception of convex-valuedness, hold for the











Proof. Consider …rst the agent’s choice problem under adverse selection, Ph
AS:
Under (C2); using (??) and the date 1 budget constraints to substitute for q;
µ
h
p(sh) in the expression of the agent’s constraint at date 0; the feasible set of
problem Ph
AS can be rewritten as follows:
Bh
AS(½;p0;p1;sh) = fch(sh) 2 <
L(1+§S¡h)
+ ;µ
h(sh) 2 £h :
p0 ¢ (ch
0(sh) ¡ wh










j(sh)rj (s;¾)] · 0; s 2 Sg
(A:1)
44Hence we see that the budget equations faced by the agent imply that his admis-














j(sh)rj(s0;¾)] 8s0 6= s
i.e. the value of excess demand less the return on ‘individual’ securities has to be
the same for all s: This condition describes the constraints on income transfers
across states arising from the incompleteness of the market.39
Under assumption 2, Bh
AS(½;p0;p1;sh) has clearly a non-empty interior, and is
closed, convex and compact for all (½;p0;p1) 2<§
++ £ <
L(1+§)
++ . Moreover, Bh
AS is
de…ned by the intersection of budget hyperplanes, and the choice variables which
appear in itsexpression, (ch;µ
h); are all, by assumption bounded below: Therefore,
by a standard argument, the correspondence de…ned by Bh
AS(½;p0;p1;sh) is also
continuous. Upper-hemi-continuity and convex-valuedness of demand then follow
from the continuity and concavity properties of the agents’ utility function (stated
in assumption 3).
It is immediate to see that, under assumption 2, Bh
AS(:) has a non-empty inte-
rior also at prices (½;p0;p1) 2 @(<§
++ £ <
L(1+§)
++ ); so that the boundary behavior
property of demand holds.
Consider next the agent’s problem in the economy with hidden information.
A similar expression as above can be obtained for the admissible choice set
Bh
HI(½;p0;p1;¼(m¡h=s¡h)) of problem Ph
HI: We easily see that Bh
HI has the same
properties as Bh
AS, with the only exception of convexity. Agents have in this case
an additional choice variable, the message mh; which a¤ects the payo¤ of the se-
curities they trade; as we already noticed since Mh is …nite, the set Bh
HI is not
convex. Since the other choice variables of Ph
HI are perfectly divisible, under as-
sumption 2, Bh
HI also has a non-empty interior and is de…ned by the intersection
of budget hyperplanes, so that the continuity of the correspondence de…ned by
Bh
HI(:) is preserved. Hence the rest of the above argument still applies.
We are now ready to prove that competitive equilibria exist. We will prove
…rst the result for economies with adverse selection.
39Under (C2); as we showed, ’pool’ securities allow agents to fully insure against ¾, while
‘individual’ securities o¤er only some partial insurance against the idiosyncratic shocks s:








































1(s;¾)]; ¾ 2 §
By Lemma ?? it follows that the above expression inherits the same properties
of individual demand: it is an upper-hemi-continuous, non-empty, convex-valued
correspondence for all (½;p0;p1) 2 <§
++ £ <
L(1+§)
++ ; and exhibits the appropri-
ate boundary behavior. Moreover, it satis…es the following expressions de…ning




p0 ¢ z0(½;p0;p1) + ½ ¢ (R
p(½;p0;p1)(µ
p(½;p0;p1) ¡ µ(½;p0;p1)) = 0 (A:2)
(::;p1(¾) ¢ z1(¾)(½;p0;p1);::) + R
p(½;p0;p1)(µ(½;p0;p1) ¡ µ
p(½;p0;p1)) = 0 (A:3)
where Rp(½;p0;p1) denotes the map obtained by substituting agents’ demand
correspondences for the level of their portfolio holdings in the expression of the
payo¤ of ‘pool’ securities (??): Equations (A:2), (A:3) are obtained by aggregating
across agents the budget constraints, after replacing q with ¡Rp0½; and using the
speci…cation of Rp(:) in (??).40
Normalize date 0 and date 1 prices in every aggregate state ¾ on the simplex.
Consider then the following truncated price sets: ¢
L+§¡1




¾ ½¾ = 1; p0;l;½¾ > ±), ¢
L¡1
± ´ ((p1(¾) 2 <L
+ :
P
l p1;l(¾) = 1; p1;l(¾) >
±); for ± su¢ciently ’small’. Pick a convex, compact set K± ½ <L(1+§) £ <2J such









Examine next the map Rp(½;p0;p1): It is upper-hemicontinuous and convex-
valued if such is agents’ demand. It is then immediate to see from the expres-
sion of (??) that, under (C1), for all (µ
h
j(sh)sh;h) such that µ
h
j(sh) 6= 0 for some
h and sh; we have r
p
j(¾) 2 cofrj(¾;sh);sh 2 Sh;h 2 Hg; where rj(¾;sh) ´
(
P
s¡h rj(¾;s)¼(s¡h=sh)); i.e. rj(¾;sh) equals the expected payo¤ of security j
40The validity of condition (C1) is crucial, as we already argued, for the aggregate payo¤ of
‘individual’ securities to be 0; and hence for (A:3) to hold, also when µ = 0:
46conditionally on ¾;sh: Therefore, if we require the payo¤ r
p
j(¾) to lie in the set






j(sh) = 0; upper-
hemicontinuity is preserved. We will impose in what follows this restriction on
the payo¤ of the ’pool’ securities in the case of no trade, and show that it implies
the validity of the fairness property (FAS) of equilibrium prices.
Hence the range of the map Rp(½;p0;p1) isgiven by RAS´ fR 2 <§£J : r
p
j(¾) 2
co[rj(¾;sh);sh 2 Sh;h 2 H]; j 2 J;¾ 2 §g for all ½;p0;p1; i.e. by the convex hull
of a …nite set of points, and is thus a convex, compact set. Furthermore, the range
of ¡(Rp)0½; when Rp 2RAS; (½;p0) 2 ¢L+§¡1; is also compact and will be denoted
by QAS:



























½;p0 2 argmaxfp0 ¢ z0 + ½ ¢ (R
p(µ
p ¡ µ))g




Under the above assumptions this map is upper-hemicontinuous and convex-
valued, and its domain is compact, convex. Therefore, by Kakutani’s Theorem it
has a …xed point [z0;(::;z1(¾);::);µ;µp;Rp;½;p0;p1;q]±:
Recalling the expression of Walras’ law derived above it is immediate to




± )§g; we have
[(z0);(Rp(µ
p¡µ));(::;z1(¾);::)]± = 0; i.e. an equilibrium41 for the perturbed econ-
omy. If not, let ± ! 0 and consider the associated sequence of …xed points. By
a standard argument (see, e.g., Werner (1985)) we can show that this sequence
is convergent and, given the boundary behavior property of excess demand, the
limit value (½;p0;p1)¤ 2 intf¢L+§¡1 £ (¢L¡1)§g:
41The equality Rp(µ
p ¡µ) = 0 implies that the values such that µ
p ¡µ = 0 also belong to the
aggregate demand correspondence.











h;h 2 Hg (A:4)
Recalling the de…nition of rj(¾;sh) it is immediate to see that (A:4) is equivalent
to condition (FAS). Therefore we have shown that at equilibrium the price of
every security is always (weakly) more than ’fair’ for some agent and (weakly)
less than ’fair’ for some other agent (where at least one of the two inequalities is
strict).
(HI) Part of the proof for economies with hidden information is essentially
the same as for economies with adverse selection. However, in this case we have
also to show that the economy can be ’convexi…ed’ by exploiting the large number
of agents. Furthermore, to show existence of an equilibrium where, in addition
to (FHI), a restriction in the spirit of ’trembling hand perfection’ is imposed on
the message strategies of agents who choose a zero level of trades (for whom the
message choice is trivial). We will have to introduce a perturbation of the economy
and proceed then by a limit argument. In what follows we will focus on the new
parts of the argument, referring to the proof above for the common parts.
Let BJ
" be an "-ball in RJ: We will prove …rst the existence of competitive equi-
libria for the ’perturbed’ economy where agents’ trades in ‘individual’ securities
are restricted to lie in the set £h
" ´ £hnBJ
" ; for all h and for " su¢ciently ’small’.
By taking the limit as " ! 0 we obtain a sequence of ’perturbed’ economies which
converges to the ’original’ economy where agents’ behavior is subject to the ’orig-
inal’ trading constraints (£h)h2H: In a ’perturbed’ economy agents have to trade
some minimal nonzero amount of the ‘individual’ securities; therefore the payo¤
of ‘pool’ securities is always given by the ’average’ payo¤ of individual securities
and the price is fair with respect to the message strategy optimally chosen by the
agents. In the limit, the same property also holds.
Let Eh ´ [ei 2 <Mh : ei
i = 1;ei
j = 0 8j 6= i; i 2 Mh] be the collection
of unit vectors in <Mh: Evidently, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
elements of Eh and of Mh; so that we can equivalently state the agents’ mes-











denote then the solution of P h
HI when trades in
‘individual’ securities are restricted to lie in the set £h
"; and mh has been replaced
by eh:









































where cof©(:)g denotes, for any map ©(:); the convex hull of the image of the map.
By Lemma ?? it follows that the above expression is a upper-hemicontinuous, non-












± be de…ned as before.
The range of the map Rp((½;p0;p1);¼(eh=sh)s2S;(£h
")h2H) we obtain by sub-





;h 2 H; in the
expression of (??) lies now in the set







mh 2 (Mh)Sh;¼(e¡h=s¡h)s¡h2S¡h 2 ¦h06=h(¢Mh0
)Sh0
;h 2 Hg; convex, compact.
Similarly, let QHI be the range of ¡(Rp)0½; when Rp 2RHI; (½;p0) 2 ¢L+§¡1; also
compact.






























































42Under assumption 2 we can always …nd " su¢ciently small so that the agents’ feasible set


























½;p0 2 argmaxfp0 ¢ z0 + ½ ¢ (R
p(µ
p ¡ µ))g
p1(¾) 2 argmaxfp1(¾) ¢ z1(¾)g; 8¾
This map is upper-hemicontinuous and convex-valued, and its domain is com-
pact, convex. Therefore Kakutani’s theorem can again be applied, yielding the
existence of a …xed point. Proceeding as above we can show that the same ex-
pression of Walras’ laws hold, and that, by letting ± ! 0 the associated sequence





" : If we then let " ! 0 we
obtain another sequence of …xed points (each of which is an equilibrium of the
associated perturbed, ’convexi…ed’ economy) which converges to an equilibrium














i.e. by the ’convexi…ed’ choice map at the ’original’ trading constraints (£h)h; and
are such that, at the prices (½;p0;p1;q)¤; commodity and securities’ markets clear,
the payo¤ of ‘pool’ securities is consistent with agents’ messages; and ¼(eh=sh)¤
sh;h
is consistent with (^ eh(sh))¤
sh (the Nash equilibrium component).
By Caratheodory’s theorem, as long as V > [(L(1+§M¡hSh)+2J +MhSh +
J§M]; we can always …nd a set of weights (°h;º)¤
h2H;º2V and a set of points, all






























































constitutes a competitive equilibrium of the original economy.
50It is then immediate from the inspection of the …xed point map and the limit
argument, that at this equilibrium property (FHI) holds. Moreover, by construc-
tion, the message strategies of agents who hold a zero amount of securities are
consistent with (in the sense of being ’close’ to) their optimal strategy when they
trade a small amount of securities.
This completes the proof.
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